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Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.- The New York Court
of Appeals relied on an English translation of Article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention in holding that a passenger on a hijacked
international flight must prove some objective bodily injury in
order to recover damages for emotional harm.
The Federal Aviation Administration reported 159 hijackings
of United States commercial airliners between January, 1961,
and November, 1972; 1 the majority of these incidents occurred
after 1967. Passengers seeking recovery for harm suffered as the
result of a hijacking frequently assert their claims against only
the airline carrier since few hijackers are available for suit or
possessed of adequate assets to satisfy a judgment.2 Airline car-
riers are attractive defendants not only because of the extent and
accessability of their assets, but also because they are held to a
standard of absolute liability for injuries sustained by passengers
on international flights under both the Warsaw Convention, offi-
cially known as "Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Transportation by Air,"3 and its subse-
quent modification, the Montreal Agreement. 4
Most lawsuits arising out of hijacking incidents have been
brought by passengers who, although not subjected to physical
impact, have suffered emotional harm. When a hijacking occurs
on an international flight, any successful legal action must fall
within the purview of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. If
United States courts construe Article 17 as precluding recovery
for purely emotional harm, then most hijack victims are faced
with the awesome task of proving the carrier's negligence under
the law of the appropriate jurisdiction.
I. BACKGROUND: THE WARsAw CONVENTION
The Warsaw Convention, to which the United States ad-
1. N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1972, at 3, col. 1.
2. Of the 218 people involved in hijacking the 159 planes, 124 persons are
fugitives, five were killed during the hijackings, three committed suicide, 44
have been convicted of air piracy or other charges in this country, five have been
convicted of such charges abroad, 19 were acquitted or had hijacking charges
dropped, and 16 are in mental institutions (footnote omitted).
Comment, 6 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 555 n.3 (1973).
3. Done Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000 (1935-36), T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11
[hereinafter cited as Warsaw Convention].
4. 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966); 49 U.S.C. § 1502, note (1970).
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hered in 1934,1 outlines rules and regulations of international air
travel for the dual purpose of effecting uniform liability among
adherent nations and of limiting the potential liability of air car-
riers.' The former was intended to create predictability and the
latter to encourage investment in the young and developing avia-
tion industry.7 The Convention created a rebuttable presumption
of liability' on the part of air carriers engaged in international
transportation for injuries or death to their passengers, subject to
the defense of contributory negligence.' This liability was limited
to $8,300 per passenger."0
Concomitant with the growth of the aviation industry was an
increase in public dissatisfaction with the low limit on passenger
recovery." The United States' dissatisfaction culminated on Nov-
ember 15, 1965,12 with notification to the world community of its
intention to withdraw from the Convention six months there-
after. 3 In order to avoid this imminent withdrawal, an interna-
tional diplomatic conference produced the 1966 Montreal Agree-
ment.'4
5. The declaration of adherence of the United States was deposited in Warsaw,
Poland, on July 31, 1934. 49 Stat. 3000 (1935-36).
6. Eck v. United Arab Airlines, 15 N.Y.2d 53, 59, 203 N.E.2d 640, 642, 255 N.Y.S.2d
249, 252 (1964).
7. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80
HARV. L. Rav. 497, 498-500 (1967).
8. The English translation of art. 20, para. 1, provides:
The carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his agents have taken all
necessary measures to avoid the damages or that it was impossible for him or
them to take such measures.
49 Stat. 3014, 3019 (1935-36), 49 U.S.C. § 1502, note (1970) [hereinafter cited as the
English translation]. Criteria of liability are set forth in Article 17. See text accompanying
notes 63-65 infra.
9. The English translation of art. 21 provides:
If the carrier proves that the damage was caused by or contributed to by the
negligence of the injured person the court may, in accordance with the provi-
sions of its own law, exonerate the carrier wholly or partly from his liability.
10. The English translation of Warsaw Convention, art. 22, para. 1, provides:
In the transportation of passengers the liability of the carrier for each passenger
shall be limited to the sum of 125,000 francs. [$8,300].
11. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 7, at 504, 545-46.
12. 53 DEP'T STATE BULL. 923 (1965).
13. The English translation of Warsaw Convention, art. 39, para. 2, states:
Denunciation shall take effect six months after the notification of denunciation,
and shall operate only as regards the party which shall have proceeded to
denunciation.
See Kreindler, The Denunciation of the Warsaw Convention, 31 J. AiR L. & Com. 291
(1965).
14. 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966); 49 U.S.C. § 1502, note (1970).
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The Montreal Agreement retained all but two of the provi-
sions of the Warsaw Convention. The monetary limitation of
$8,300 was raised to $75,000. In addition, all defenses under Arti-
cle 20(1)15 of the Warsaw Convention were waived, thus replacing
the presumption of liability with absolute liability."6
Judicial application of the absolute liability standard has
been inconsistent. Cases such as Rosman v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc. 17 exemplify the problems faced by a hijacked passenger who
suffers emotional, as opposed to physical, injury. The New York
Court of Appeals was called upon to decide whether the defen-
dant airline's absolute liability for "de mort, de blessure, ou de
toute autre lesion corporelle"'' entitled plaintiffs to recover dam-
ages for purely psychic trauma suffered on board a hijacked air-
craft." The Rosman court's refusal to employ the official French
text of the Warsaw Convention did not foster a consistent and
dynamic approach to treaty interpretation. The court also failed
to recognize the appropriateness of applying modem principles of
tort liability.
HI. THE ROSMAN CASE: FACT PATTERN
On September 6, 1970, a Trans World Airlines [TWA] 707
was hijacked en route from Tel Aviv to New York City by mem-
bers of the self-styled Popular Front for the Liberation of Pales-
tine."0 As passengers on this aborted flight, the plaintiffs in
Rosman were held captive in the desert for six days. None of the
plaintiffs were actually struck. They were, however, subjected to
extreme temperatures, confined for long hours in their seats, and
placed in continual fear for their lives; they claimed to have suf-
fered severe emotional anguish in addition to relatively minor
physical ailments."
15. See note 8 supra.
16. 1 L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCMENT LAw § 12A.01 (1971).
17. 40 App. Div. 2d 963, 338 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1st Dep't 1972), rev'd, 34 N.Y.2d 385, 314
N.E.2d 848, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Rosman], consolidated on
appeal with Herman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 69 Misc. 2d 642, 330 N.Y.S.2d 829
(Sup. Ct.), rev'd 40 App. Div. 2d 850, 337 N.Y.S.2d 827 (2d Dep't 1972), rev'd 34 N.Y.2d
385, 314 N.E.2d 848, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Herman].
18. Warsaw Convention, art. 17. This phrase has been unofficially translated as
"death or wounding ... or any other bodily injury .... ." 49 Stat. 3014, 3018 (1935-
36). See text accompanying notes 63-65 infra (for both the authorized French text and
unofficial English translation of Article 17 in its entirety).
19. 34 N.Y.2d at 388, 314 N.E.2d at 849, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 99.
20. Id., 314 N.E.2d at 850, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
21. Id. at 388-89, 314 N.E.2d at 850, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 100-01. Edith Rosman alleged
1975]
BROOKLYN J. INT L. [Vol. 11:1
On September 25, 1971, Edith Rosman and her two minor
children brought a personal injury action against TWA.2" There
was no allegation of negligence;2 the claim was predicated on the
liability provisions of the Warsaw Convention, as modified by the
absolute liability provisions of the Montreal Agreement.
Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the issue of lia-
bility and the Supreme Court, New York County, granted the
motion. 24 The Appellate Division, First Department,25 reversed
the lower court on the ground that "a triable issue of fact" was
presented as to the precise meaning of the official French text of
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention,26 which concerned the lia-
bility of the carrier. The Court of Appeals reversed the First De-
partment and affirmed the holding of the trial court that liability
could be determined as a matter of law. Although plaintiffs were
granted summary judgment,27 the decision has been described as
a mere "Pyrrhic victory"' since the court held that physical in-
jury must be present before emotional injury is compensable.29
that as a result of the experience she had become extremely nervous, tense, and depressed.
She also claimed to have developed a backache, swollen feet, and discoloration of her legs
and back. Her daughters claimed to have developed boils and skin irritations, as well as
the same mental injuries. Id.
22. In addition, Edith Rosman's husband, Eliezer Rosman, sued in his representative
and derivative capacities for medical expenses and loss of services. Id. at 388 n.1, 314
N.E.2d at 850 n.1, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 100 n.1.
23. Although the Rosmans brought their claim under the absolute liability provision
of the Warsaw Convention, they also had a potential cause of action grounded in negli-
gence under New York law.
24. The New York Supreme Court, in granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs
in both Rosman and Herman, concluded that there were no triable issues of fact as to
defendants' liability, but directed hearings as to the amount of damages for both physical
injuries and psychic trauma.
25. The appellate division reversed the lower court decisions in both Rosman and
Herman and found that triable issues of fact were presented as to the precise meaning of
the French text of Article 17.
26. See text accompanying note 63 infra (for Article 17 in the original French).
27. 34 N.Y.2d 385, 314 N.E.2d 848, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1974).
28. Kreindler, Hijacking and Emotional Trauma, 171 N.Y.L.J. no. 120, 1, 3, col. 5
(1974).
29. 34 N.Y.2d 385, 314 N.E.2d 848, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1974). The order of the supreme
court granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the issue of liability was reinstated.
The case was remitted for trial on the issue of damages which were limited to
palpable, objective bodily injuries, including those caused by the psychic
trauma of the hijacking, and for the damages flowing from those bodily injuries,
but not for the trauma as such or for the nonbodily or behavioral manifestations
of that trauma.
Id. at 400, 314 N.E.2d at 857, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 110.
CASE COMMENTS
III. METHODS OF TREATY INTERPRETATION
A fundamental problem facing the Rosman court was the
choice of an appropriate approach to treaty interpretation. 0 The
Warsaw Convention was written in one official language,
French." English was never an authorized language, and the
United States adhered to the French version. According to the
American Law Institute's Restatement (Second) of Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States,
[t]he extent to which an international agreement creates,
changes or defines relationships under international law is de-
termined in case of doubt by the interpretation of the agree-
ment. The primary object of interpretation is to ascertain the
meaning intended by the parties for the terms in which the
agreement is expressed, having regard to the context in which
they occur and the circumstances under which the agreement
was made. This meaning is determined in light of all relevant
factors.32
The court referred to this section of the Restatement in its opin-
ion, but ignored its directives in reaching a decision.,, By using a
translation rather than the original French text, the court acted
contrary to generally accepted international and American theo-
ries of treaty interpretation. 4 Unless a translation is an author-
ized text, it can never be a fair substitute for the original text of
a treaty.35
The two major schools of treaty interpretation are textualism
and contextualism. The former focuses on the treaty and the
"ordinary meaning" of its terms while the latter focuses on the
30. See generally Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, 29 Am. J. INT'L L. 653
(Supp. 1935).
31. Warsaw Convention, art. 36.
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 146
(1965) (emphasis added).
33. After quoting from the RESTATEMENT, the court stated that,
[t]he parties agree that the translation of Article 17 contained at 49 Stat. 3018
is accurate and we will refer therefore to the English terms.
34 N.Y.2d at 396, 314 N.E.2d at 855, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 106. The fact that the parties agreed
upon the use of an English translation should not have been accepted as conclusive by
the court. See text accompanying note 39 infra.
34. See generally Falk, On Treaty Interpretation and the New Haven Approach:
Achievements and Prospects, 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 323 (1968); Fitzmaurice, Vae Victis or Woe
to the Negotiators! Your Treaty or Our "Interpretation" of It?, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 358
(1971); Hardy, The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and
Tribunals, 37 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 72 (1961).
35. See Todok v. Union State Bank, 281 U.S. 449 (1930).
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treaty and all related material, including working drafts.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties36 adopted the
textual approach to treaty interpretation: "A treaty shall be in-
terpreted in good-faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose. ' 3 Determining the "ordinary
meaning" of a word in one's own language is problematic, but the
task becomes formidable when the treaty is in a foreign language.
The only article in the Vienna Convention offering guidelines is
Article 33, which simply provides: "A version of the treaty in a
language other than one of those in which the text is authenti-
cated shall be considered an authentic text only if the treaty so
provides or the parties [i.e., the signatories] so agree. '3 The
plaintiff and defendant in Rosman mutually agreed upon an Eng-
lish translation of Article 17, 31 which the court too readily
adopted. Such mutual agreement did not confer upon the court
the authority to rely upon an unofficial translation which was not
endorsed by the signatories, any more than consent to jurisdiction
by both parties would confer jurisdiction on a court. Although the
textual approach to treaty interpretation is not an absolute rule
of law, its application by the Rosman court would have been
appropriate as it would have compelled the court to refer to the
original text.
Although it was rejected by the drafters of the Vienna Con-
vention, the contextual approach to treaty interpretation" is the
most widely accepted technique in the United States.' Myres S.
McDougal has reaffirmed a characterization of this approach
which was made forty years ago:
A treaty is to be interpreted in the light of the general purpose
which it is intended to serve. The historical background of the
36. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention]. The text of Vienna
Convention may also be found at 8 INT'L LEG. MAT'S 679 (1969); 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875
(1969).
37. Vienna Convention, art. 31.
38. Id., art. 33.
39. 34 N.Y.2d at 396, 314 N.E.2d at 855, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 106.
40. See generally M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & J. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF
AGREEMENTS AND THE WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 50 (1967).
41. See generally articles cited note 34 supra. Although the Rosman court adopted
neither the contextual nor the textual approach, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York considered the contextual approach to be part of New York
law. Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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treaty, travaux pr~paratoires, the circumstances of the parties
at the time the treaty was entered into, the change in these
circumstances sought to be effected, the subsequent conduct of
the parties in applying the provisions of the treaty, and the
conditions prevailing at the time interpretation is being made,
are to be considered in connection with the general purpose
which the treaty intended to serve.42
To contextualists, language is merely one indication of meaning;43
to textualists, language is paramount. However, despite the theo-
retical variances between the two schools both firmly believe that
what must be interpreted is the treaty in its original language.
The use of an English translation of the Warsaw Convention
by the Rosman court clearly negated the well-accepted and sound
theories of both the textual and contextual methods of treaty
interpretation. Its failure to take cognizance of the original
French text represents a regression in the uniform and logical
development of treaty interpretation. By examining the treaty in
the official French text, the court could have reached the same
decision and, more importantly, would have preserved a legally
sound methodology. It is this judicial lapse of methodology which
undermines Rosman.
IV. THE RIGHT TO RECOVER FOR PSYCHIC TRAUMA
Mental injuries, like physical injuries, can be debilitating
and can result in substantial economic loss." Judicial acknowl-
edgement in the United States of a legal right to be compensated
for mental injuries may be historically linked to the development
by modem medicine of techniques to not only identify mental
distress but also to establish a causal relationship between emo-
tional disturbance and physical injury.45 Courts and juries recog-
42. McDougal, The International Law Commission's Draft Articles Upon Interpre-
tation: Textuality Redivivus, 61 Am. J. INT'L L. 992, 999-1000 (1967), quoting Draft
Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 19(a), 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 653, 937 (Supp. 1935).
43. Larsen, The United States-Italy Air Transport Arbitration: Problems of Treaty
Interpretation and Enforcement, 61 Am. J. INT'L L. 496 (1967). The words become the axis
around which the whole wheel of language, intent, and subsequent events involves." Id.
at 512.
44. See Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MicH. L. REv. 497
(1922); Note, The Right to Mental Security, 16 U. FLA. L. Rav. 540 (1964). See also Hargis
v. Knoxville Power Co., 175 N.C. 31, 94 S.E. 702 (1917).
45. Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic
Stimuli, 30 VA. L. Rav. 193 (1944); Note, supra note 44.
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nized that any serious injury to the body is likely to have a con-
comitant effect on the mental state of the victim, but recovery for
mental distress was granted only when physical injury was dem-
onstrated to exist." In the late nineteenth century, cases such as
Mitchell v. Rochester Railway Co.4" and Spade v. Lynn & Boston
Railroad Co."8 established the rule that in order to recover for
mental distress there had to be an "impact." This theory was
defined by a Georgia court to mean that "the right to recover for
a mental condition induced by the tortious act of another is de-
pendent upon the existence of a physical injury." 49
The impact rule was consistent with three practical problems
regarding compensation for psychic trauma: determining appro-
priate damages, identifying valid claims, and avoiding a poten-
tial flood of litigation. The main concern was the prevention of
false claims." Yet when a physical injury was not apparent, the
courts strained to find an impact when circumstances compelled
them to compensate a victim for obvious mental suffering."1
Zelinsky v. Chimics 2 exemplifies this judicial maneuvering. Ap-
parently feeling that the plaintiff's claim that she suffered from
a serious nervous disorder was genuine, the court construed the
"jarring and jostling" of a minor automobile accident as the req-
uisite impact to justify recovery of damages for subsequent men-
tal injuries.53 As Dean Prosser has stated:
The only valid objection against recovery ... is the danger of
vexatious suits and fictitious claims. . . .It is entirely possible
46. Authorities cited note 50 infra.
47. 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
48. 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897).
49. Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581, 144 S.E. 680, 681 (1928).
50. See, e.g., Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958); Brisboise v. Kansas
City Pub. Serv. Co., 303 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. 1957); Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass.
285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897). See also 13 U. MIMI L. Ray. 370 (1966); 39 TEMP. L.Q. 229 (1966).
51. Porter v. Delaware, Lackawanna & W.R.R., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 A. 860 (1906) (dust
in the eye); Kasey v. Suburban Gas Heat of Kennewick, Inc., 60 Wash. 2d 468, 374 P.2d
549 (1962) (a jolt); Boston v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 223 Ind. 425, 61 N.E.2d 326 (1945) (a
jolt). An extreme example may be found in Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App.
581, 144 S.E. 680 (1928). The court found that there was sufficient physical impact when
the defendant's horse, during a circus performance, "evacuated his bowels" onto plain-
tiff's lap and allowed recovery for the resultant "embarrassment, mortification, and men-
tal pain and suffering." Id., 144 S.E. at 681.
52. 196 Pa. Super. 312, 175 A.2d 351 (1961).
53. Id. Mrs. Zelinsky testified that "she did not sustain any physical injuries in the
accident other than the nervous condition." Id. at 314, 175 A.2d at 352. Mr. Zelinsky, who
also sued for injury in the form of a neurosis, testified that "[t]here were no cuts on his
body as a result of the accident and he wasn't physically hurt." Id. (emphasis added).
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to allow recovery only upon satisfactory evidence and deny it
when there is nothing to corroborate the claim, or to look for
some guarantee of genuineness in the circumstances of the
case. 4
Under the impact theory, courts were able to calculate com-
pensation for purely mental elements of injuries which included
physical impact.5 Since the law could provide a remedy for men-
tal injury which was preceded by physical injury, it was eventu-
ally recognized that the law should provide a remedy when men-
tal injury occurs alone. The very courts which established the
arbitrary "impact" rule to distinguish between real and false
claims have subsequently discarded the doctrine."
The fear that courts would be flooded with litigation if purely
mental injuries were compensable has not been supported by
subsequent experience.57 The genuineness of any claim, whether
it be a stiff neck from an automobile accident or a psychoneurosis
from a hijacking experience, must be legally established before
damages will flow. 8 Interposed between the plaintiff and recovery
are principles of tort law and requirements of evidence. Plaintiff
must show a duty owed and breached, causation, and damages.
The practice of denying valid claims for fear of potentially fraud-
ulent ones was discarded as illogical and unjust by the New York
Court of Appeals in Battalla v. State." The court observed that
such an argument
54. W. PROSSER, LAW OF Toirrs 328 (4th ed. 1971).
55. See, e.g., Baltimore & O.R.R. v. McBride, 36 F.2d 841 (6th Cir. 1930); Easton v.
United Trade School Contracting Co., 173 Cal. 199, 159 P. 597 (1916); Canning v. Inhabit-
ants of Williamstown, 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 451 (1848). A pre-existing tendency toward an
illness which the incident in question may exacerbate will not, and has not, precluded
assessment of damages. The problems posed by this situation relate to the extent of
plaintiff's recovery, not defendant's liability. See Note, Torts-Expanding the Concept
of Recovery for Mental and Emotional Injury, 76 W. VA. L. REv. 176 (1974).
56. See Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961),
overruling Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896); Niederman v.
Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970), overruling Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142
A.2d 263 (1958).
57. See Gulf, C & S.F. Ry. v. Hayter, 93 Tex. 239, 54 S.W. 944 (1900).
58. [R]ecovery for emotional harm to one subjected directly to the tortious
act may not be disallowed so long as the evidence is sufficient to show causation
and substantiality of the harm suffered, together with a "guarantee of genuine-
ness" to which the court referred in the Ferrara case . ...
Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 383-84, 334 N.E.2d 590, 593, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638, 643
(1975), quoting Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 21, 152 N.E.2d 249, 252, 176 N.Y.S.2d
996, 1000 (1958).
59. 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961).
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from mere expediency cannot commend itself to a Court of jus-
tice, resulting in the denial of a logical legal right and remedy
in all cases because in some a fictitious injury may be urged as
a real one. 0
If there is a substantial wrong, an injured party should have the
right to bring an action. 1
The Rosman court failed to reconcile its interpretation of the
Warsaw Convention with the growth in recognition of the right
to recover for purely psychic trauma. Although the impact rule
is obsolete in New York,"2 the Rosman court chose to revive it.
V. RATIONALE FOR THE RosMN DECISION
In the Rosman case, the issue of whether a passenger of a
hijacked aircraft could recover against the air carrier for psychic
trauma alone depended upon the court's interpretation of Article
17 of the Warsaw Convention.
Le transporteur est responsable du dommage survenue en case
de mort, de blessure, ou de toute autre l6sion corporelle subie
par un voyageur lorsque l'accident qui a caus6 le dommage s'est
produit A bord de l'aeronef ou au cours de toutes operations
d'embarquement et de d6barquement.13
The English translation, which was considered by the parties in
Rosman to be accurate but which is of no binding force since
French is the only authoritative language of the Convention," is
as follows:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of
the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury
suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the dam-
age so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course
of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking. 5
60. Id. at 241, 176 N.E.2d at 731, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 37, quoting Green v. T.A. Shoe-
maker & Co., 111 Md. 69, 81, 73 A. 688, 692 (1909).
61. Id. at 240, 176 N.E.2d at 730, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 36.
62. Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961). In a
recent case, Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1975),
the court held that the daughter of a patient in a State hospital could recover for anxiety
neurosis suffered as a direct result of her receipt of a telegram negligently sent by the
hospital misinforming her of the death of her mother who was in fact alive and well.
63. The French text is the only text with official, binding status. Warsaw Convention,
art. 36.
64. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
65. 49 Stat. at 3018.
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A. Significance of the French Text of the Warsaw Convention
The threshold question in Rosman was the significance, if
any, of the official French text of the Warsaw Convention. The
court cited the holding in Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air
France66 that "the binding meaning of the terms of the Conven-
tion is the French legal meaning";67 however, the Rosman court
did not refer to the French legal system for an interpretation of
the legal significance of the terms at issue (i.e., "de mort, de
blessure, ou de toute autre lesion corporelle"). Rather, the court
indicated that the English translation would suffice, based upon
both the agreement of the parties and the court's finding that the
translation was accurate."
The use of a translated version of a treaty is contrary to
recognized principles of treaty interpretation. The Rosman court
stated that it was "aware" 9 of the Supreme Court's holding in
Todok v. Union State Bank that "where the text of a treaty is
drawn in only one language, that language is controlling. "71
Todok exemplifies the questionable value of translations in a sit-
uation similar to that in Rosman. The only official text of the
treaty under consideration in Todok was in French and both par-
ties agreed that the English translation was accurate. The legal
connotations of the terms at issue, however, raised several ques-
tions which led the Supreme Court to rely on the original French
text in order to reach a decision.72
The Rosman court, faced with the same predicament, inex-
plicably acted contrary to the principle laid down in Todok and
thus negated the effect of an important affirmative decision made
by the drafters and signatories of the Warsaw Convention in stip-
ulating that the only official text of the Convention would be in
the French language. 73 As emphasized by Drion, "in legal think-
66. 386 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968).
67. Id. at 330.
68. 34 N.Y.2d at 396, 314 N.E.2d at 855, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 106.
69. Id. at 392, 314 N.E.2d at 852, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 103.
70. 281 U.S. 449 (1930).
71. Id. at 454.
72. The French phrase "fonds et biens" has been translated as "goods and effects."
At common law "goods" did not include real estate, while at civil law "biens" did. Judicial
decisions in the United States generally interpret "goods and effects" to include real
estate. The Todok Court did the same and, in applying the civil law concept of "goods
and effects," it thus relied upon the actual French rather than upon a translation. Id.
73. Warsaw Convention, art. 36.
1975]
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
ing even more than in other matters, choice of a language implies
a choice of approach. The mere using of the English language sets
its stamp on the way of one's legal thinking."" Accordingly, the
deliberate selection of the French language set its personal stamp
upon the Convention.
There is even compelling evidence that the English transla-
tion selected by the parties in Rosman was inaccurate. Although
the parties agreed to a translation equating "lesion corporelle"
with "bodily injury," the formal Notice of Denunciation of War-
saw which the United States sent to Poland in 1965 referred to
the Article 17 liability of the airlines as including "death or
personal injury," not "bodily injury."
The United States of America wishes to state that it gives this
notification solely because of the low limits of liability for death
or personal injury provided in the Warsaw Convention. 71
"Personal injury" suggests inclusion of psychic trauma,
while "bodily injury" may not. Clearly, uniformity of interpreta-
tion is doomed if courts use unofficial translations of the text of
treaties. The use of an English translation, especially when the
decision turned on the nuances of a particular phrase, greatly
minimizes the value of the Rosman decision.
B. Cause of Action and its Relationship to Local Law
The Warsaw Convention does not create a cause of action;"
Article 17 merely creates a presumption of liability and leaves to
local law the determination of whether a justiciable claim exists.77
McMahon v. United States" defined a cause of action as "a legal
wrong, the thing which becomes a ground for suit."79 The Conven-
tion "does not 'exclusively regulate' the relationship between pas-
senger and carrier on an international flight, but rather sets limits
74. D. BiLLyou, AIR LAW 1 (2d ed. 1964) quoting H. DRION, LIMITATION OF LIABILITIES
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW vii (1954).
75. 53 DEP'T STATE BuLL. at 924 (emphasis added).
76. Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677, 679 (2d Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957); Komlos v. Campagnie Nationale Air France, 111 F. Supp.
393, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 209 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 820 (1954).
77. 34 N.Y.2d at 398, 314 N.E.2d at 856, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 108. See cases cited note
76 supra.
78. 186 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 342 U.S. 25 (1951).
79. Id. at 230.
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on and renders uniform certain of the aspects of that relation-
ship. "80
The Rosman court recognized that the Warsaw Convention
specifically defers to the law of the forum in questions of contribu-
tory negligence,8 ' procedure,8 2 the method of determining the stat-
ute of limitations, 3 and the standard of willful misconduct. 4 By
refusing to give recognition to the significance of local law and to
extend its application to the area of liability for mental injuries,
the court lost an opportunity to foster a consistent and dynamic
interpretation of the Warsaw Convention. Justification for this
approach can be found in the observation of Andreas F. Lowen-
feld, Chairman of the United States Delegation to the Montreal
Conference, that definition of the terms "blessure" and "de toute
autre lesion corporelle" in Article 17 is an area which the Conven-
tion left to local law. 5 Contemporary cases demonstrate that local
New York law includes recovery for purely mental injuries. This
approach was suggested in Judge Hopkins' dissent in Herman v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc. :86
It is not without significance that at the time of execution [of
the Montreal Agreement] in 1966 the holding in Battalla v.
State of New York, permitting recovery for fright without
physical impact, had been in existence since 1961 and that,
indeed, as Judge Burke in Battalla pointed out, damages for
emotional disturbance were then allowed in England and in a
majority of American jurisdictions.
The majority opinion in Rosman contains an inherent con-
80. Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 351 F. Supp. 702, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd
per curiam, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973).
81. Warsaw Convention, art. 21. See note 9 supra.
82. The English translation of Warsaw Convention, art. 28, para. 2 provides that
"[q]uestions of procedure shall be governed by the law of the court to which the case is
submitted."
83. The English translation of Warsaw Convention, art. 29, para. 2 provides that
"[t]he method of calculating the period of limitation shall be determined by the law of
the court to which the case is submitted."
84. The English translation of Warsaw Convention, art. 25, para. 1 provides:
The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this conven-
tion which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his wilful
misconduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance with the law of the
court to which the case is submitted, is considered to be equivalent to wilful
misconduct.
85. Lowenfeld, Hijacking, Warsaw and the Problem of Psychic Trauma, 1 SYRACUSE
J. INr' L. & Coi. 346, 347 (1972).
86. 40 App. Div. 2d 850, 337 N.Y.S.2d 827 (2d Dep't 1972).
87. Id. at 852-53, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 831 (citations omitted).
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tradiction. The court recognized the principle that the Warsaw
Convention does not create a cause of action, but instead defers
to local law." The court then acknowledged that local law pro-
vided a cause of action for purely psychic trauma" but refused to
allow recovery on that cause of action on the ground that it was
not provided for in the Warsaw Convention.
C. The Spirit of the Warsaw Convention
The Rosman court justified its refusal to interpret the War-
saw Convention according to its French legal meaning by stating
that "[i]t does not follow from the fact that the treaty is written
in French that in interpreting it we are forever chained to
French law, either as it existed when the treaty was written or in
its present state of development." 9' However, in the court's at-
tempt to construe the key phrases in the unofficial English trans-
lation, it stated that: "[w]e deal with the term as used in an
international agreement written almost fifty years ago."92 One
wonders what were the court's points of reference: French law or
English law? Fifty years ago or today?
This internal contradiction in Rosman undermines not only
the holding but also any hope for uniformity, as has subsequently
become apparent in a contrary holding by the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York in Husserl v.
Swiss Air Transportation Co.9 [hereinafter referred to as Husserl
I]. This case involved facts similar to those in Rosman and a
claim for recovery for mental anguish and fright under the same
Article of the Warsaw Convention. In his first opinion
[hereinafter referred to as Husserl 1]," Judge Tyler denied defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment and dismissal of the com-
plaint on the ground that a hijacking is an "accident" within the
meaning of the Convention. The judge added: "I must confess to
having some difficulty reading [Article 17 of] the Warsaw Con-
vention to permit recovery for mental anguish and suffering
alone."9 Citing Judge Tyler's dictum as support, the Rosman
88. 34 N.Y.2d at 398, 314 N.E.2d at 856, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 108. See cases cited in
note 76 supra.
89. 34 N.Y.2d at 397, 314 N.E.2d at 855, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 107.
90. Id. at 400, 314 N.E.2d at 857, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 110.
91. Id. at 394, 314 N.E.2d at 853, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 105.
92. Id. at 397, 314 N.E.2d at 855, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 107.
93. 388 F. Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
94. 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), af'd per curiam, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973).
95. Id. at 708.
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court precluded recovery for purely psychic trauma. 6
In Husserl II, subsequent to Rosman, a new motion by defen-
dant carrier for summary judgment and dismissal of the com-
plaint was heard by Judge Tyler." In addition to denying the
motion, Judge Tyler stated that, "[t]o the extent those courts'
[e.g., Rosman] citations of that opinion [Husserl 1] indicated
some small reliance on this court's dictum concerning the phrase
at issue, I proffer my apologies."98 His reevaluation was founded
on alternative propositions: that "the drafters [of Article 17]
believed that the phrase at issue comprehended all personal inju-
ries involving the organic functioning of a human being,"9 or that
they "neglected to consider injuries not comprehended by the
phrase.""'
If they intended the former, Article 17 should be interpreted to
comprehend mental and psychosomatic injuries. If they had no
specific intention, Article 17 should be interpreted in the man-
ner most likely to effect the purposes of the Convention."'
This leaves one question: what is the Convention's purpose? For-
tunately, Eck v. United Arab Airlines'°' answered that question
more than a decade before these decisions.
The purposes were to provide uniform rules of limitation con-
cerning the liability of international air carriers to their passen-
gers and to provide a uniform remedy for these passengers to the
extent that this remedy would not burden the carrier more than
the Convention provisions allowed." 3
Therefore, if the Convention's language is construed broadly, as
Judge Tyler suggests, it would encompass all injuries not specifi-
cally barred'014 and create uniform liability. Judge Tyler also dis-
96. 34 N.Y.2d at 400, 314 N.E.2d at 857, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 110.
97. 388 F. Supp. 1238.
98. Id. at 1251.
99. Id. at 1248.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 15 N.Y.2d 53, 203 N.E.2d 640, 255 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1964).
103. Id. at 59, 203 N.E.2d at 642, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 252.
104. 388 F. Supp. at 1250.
To effect the treaty's avowed purpose, the types of injuries enumerated should
be construed expansively to encompass as many types of injury as are colorably
within the ambit of enumerated types. Mental and psychosomatic injuries are
colorably within that ambit and are, therefore, comprehended by Article 17.
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cussed the application of local law to the cause of action. He held
that to the extent that Battalla provides a cause of action for such
emotional injuries, plaintiff can recover if he successfully meets
the requirements of modem tort liability: duty, breach, proxi-
mate cause, and damages.' 5
HusserI 11, like Rosman, did not apply accepted principles of
treaty interpretation in that Judge Tyler also relied on the
English translation of the Warsaw Convention.' 6 Even though
the Husserl II opinion reaches a conclusion more consistent with
modem principles of tort liability'7 than did Rosman, its metho-
dological inadequacies limit its contribution to international jur-
isprudence.
VI. CONCLUSION
"The least one can ask of an opinion is that it illuminate the
situation and add to our comprehension of the direction in which
we are being pulled. . . .To be less is simply to add to chaos, to
increase the noise."'08 The Rosman decision, as well as Husserl II,
failed to meet this standard of clarity. Rosman not only refused
to recognize the applicability and appropriateness of modern tort
liability but also ignored fundamental, well-reasoned principles
of treaty interpretation in relying on an unauthorized text in its
determination of the meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw Con-
vention. These two decisions leave future victims at the mercy of
both the hijackers and the courts.
Jacalyn Fischer Barnett
105. Id. at 1252.
106. Id. at 1245.
107. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
108. Larsen, Between Scylla & Charybdis in Treaty Interpretation, 63 Am. J. INT'L
L. 108, 110 (1969).
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